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ABSTRACT
ACCELERATING RSA PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
VIA HARDWARE ACCELERATION
FEBRUARY 2020
PAVITHRA RAMESH
B.Tech., MODEL ENGINEERING COLLEGE, KOCHI, KERALA, INDIA
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sandip Kundu
A large number and a variety of sensors and actuators, also known as edge devices
of the Internet of Things, belonging to various industries - health care monitoring,
home automation, industrial automation, have become prevalent in today’s world.
These edge devices need to communicate data collected to the central system oc-
casionally and often in burst mode which is then used for monitoring and control
purposes. To ensure secure connections, Asymmetric or Public Key Cryptography
(PKC) schemes are used in combination with Symmetric Cryptography schemes. RSA
(Rivest - Shamir- Adleman) is one of the most prevalent public key cryptosystems,
and has computationally intensive operations which might have a high latency when
implemented in resource constrained environments. The objective of this thesis is to
design an accelerator capable of increasing the speed of execution of the RSA algo-
rithm in such resource constrained environments. The bottleneck of the algorithm
iv
is determined by analyzing the performance of the algorithm in various platforms -
Intel Linux Machine, Raspberry Pi, Nios soft core processor. In designing the ac-
celerator to speedup bottleneck function, we realize that the accelerator architecture
will need to be changed according to the resources available to the accelerator. We
use high level synthesis tools to explore the design space of the accelerator by taking
into consideration system level aspects like the number of ports available to transfer
inputs to the accelerator, the word size of the processor, etc. We also propose a new
accelerator architecture for the bottleneck function and the algorithm it implements
and compare the area and latency requirements of it with other designs obtained
from design space exploration. The functionality of the design proposed is verified
and prototyped in Zynq SoC of Xilinx Zedboard.
v
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INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is considered to be the third wave of innovation in infor-
mation technology, to follow the earlier waves of Internet and mobile computing. IoT
devices enable useful services by integrating computation, communication, and sens-
ing capabilities, gathering and processing data from which intelligence is extracted to
enable services towards a smarter world. The number of IoT edge devices connected
to the Internet already surpasses the world’s population with economic impact pre-
dicted in trillions of dollars. The number of devices connected to the internet has
gone from 500 million in 2003 to 12.5 billion in 2010 and is predicted to reach 50 bil-
lion by 2020 [5]. The advancements in IoT technology have allowed a variety of edge
devices to penetrate into the real world like never before. IoT devices help monitor,
control and streamline operations across sectors such as consumer, healthcare, indus-
trial, transportation and military, to name a few. Consumer applications like smart
home, elder care, medical and healthcare applications like remote health monitor-
ing, emergency notification systems, transportation industrial applications like smart
traffic control, smart parking and military applications for surveillance and combat
related objectives are enabled due to sensors like temperature, pressure, accelerom-
eter, motion detection, image, chemical, IR among others. Sensors and actuators,
also known as edge devices are resource constrained and usually have microcontroller
units or processors with limited computing and networking capabilities, to enable
exchange of information to other entities on the network or to communicate with
the central system. With ubiquity of IoT devices in all facets of our lives, privacy
and security risks of the edge devices have emerged as a dominant concern as they
continuously collect and share data about our surroundings. Ensuring security across
1
all levels of IoT architecture is essential, however it is more crucial to enable security
measures at the end nodes. Such devices, if deployed in an unprotected environment,
could become prey to attackers eavesdropping information, providing unauthorized
access to device or data, allowing data to be tampered with, or even attach other
unauthorized devices to the network. Thus, it has become an utmost necessity to
implement cryptography to provide security, ensure privacy, authentication among
other services in the end nodes which are resource constrained with low memory, and
limited computational capabilities operating on a string power budget.
Figure I.1: Cryptographic schemes against attack on data collection
Many applications do not demand continuous connectivity. In the medical field,
sensors could be used to collect medical data from a patient’s body, but only com-
municate with the health care server system, if the data sensed is abnormal. Sensors
could also be used for sensing voltage, humidity, temperature etc. which require the
central system to be notified only if the measured data changes considerably that de-
mands control actions to be taken. Some of the edge devices pack data into batches
to minimize network power. If the nature of the application does not require con-
tinuous connection batched data transmission is the preferred option. Maintaining a
continuous network connection is power consuming, also makes it easier for attackers
to access the devices through network and hence is not preferred. Establishing a
connection as and when needed in the form of sessions is much better suited for such
2
applications which transmit/receive data in bursts as shown in figure I.2. Each such
session needs to follow an authentication protocol and data encryption protocols for
ensuring secure transfer of data to valid entities. Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
schemes are commonly used to implement key exchange and authentication proto-
cols. These security schemes involve three processes: Key generation, encryption and
decryption. Generating new set of keys for each session ensures that the keys do not
have to be stored in the end nodes, preventing it from being tampered. Generating
new set of keys per session also enables the network to be disconnected when not it
use.
Figure I.2: Session based data transfer between sensors and servers
Implementing PKC schemes on such resource restricted environments are usually
computationally expensive and time consuming. Such System on Chips (SoCs) would
benefit from having a dedicated purpose-built circuitry, also known as an accelerator,
that performs a portion of a task and helps in increasing the overall performance.
Embedding hardware accelerators in SoC can also lead to energy efficiency improve-
ment at the cost of a slightly larger die. Enabling hardware acceleration is a two step
process - identification of the bottleneck and designing accelerator architecture for the
bottleneck function. To ensure optimum performance gain, the hardware accelerator
function has to be carefully chosen so that the most performance can be obtained
from minimal hardware investment.
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In this work, we consider the RSA algorithm [6], the most prevalent Public Key
Cryptography scheme today and analyze it to determine the bottleneck function which
is responsible for a substantial amount of overall execution time. We run the RSA
algorithms on three platforms with varying processing power - an Intel Linux machine,
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ running an ARM processor and a Nios II soft processor
configured on an Altera FPGA and analyze the execution of the algorithm in all three
platforms to determine the bottleneck of the algorithm.
We then aim to design a minimal accelerator, that is suitable for such resource
restricted devices and capable of speeding up the bottleneck function and in effect
the whole algorithm. Crypto-coprocessors and hardware accelerators for speeding
up the RSA encryption and decryption are very popular, but these circuits take
the entire algorithm implementation load off of the processor. We aim to design an
accelerator that is minimal in functionality but is still capable of accelerating the
overall algorithm.
We take into consideration system level aspects like the input availability for the
accelerator which is a key factor in determining the overall latency of the circuit.
According to the resources available, for instance, the number of ports, that help in
transferring data to the accelerator, the design will need to be changed.
After determining the hotspot function, algorithmic variations are considered to
determine the best possible design under restricted input availability. An architectural
variation to implement the hotspot function is proposed. Using Vivado HLS, the
latency and area requirements of the proposed design is compared with that of other
architectures to implement the hotspot function under similar system constraints. We
configure the Zynq SoC with our proposed accelerator design as IP and prototype in
Zedboard to verify its functionality.
Chapter 1 discusses the context and background information relevant to the work.
In chapter 2, the results of performance profiling of the RSA system on embedded
4
devices are discussed. Chapter 3 deals with design approach taken for accelerator de-
sign, the proposed accelerator architecture and the architectures taken for comparison.
Chapter 4 discusses the testbench for experiments, experimental setup, observations
and analysis of results obtained. Chapter 6 concludes the work and discusses possible
extension to the work.
5
CHAPTER 1
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CONTEXT
1.1 Cryptographic schemes for securing edge devices
Edge devices like sensors and actuators form the backbone of Internet of Things.
At the same time, they are the weakest links posing a threat to both security and
privacy. In August 2019, NIST has released a draft listing Security feature recom-
mendations for IoT Devices [7]. The trend in enabling IoT security is shifting from
being optional to being essential and mandatory.
Proper use of cryptographic schemes is essential to securing all edge devices. The
cryptographic schemes can be classified into two categories, namely symmetric or
private key cryptography and asymmetric or public key cryptography (PKC). Both
help in achieving the following objectives or services [8]:
• Confidentiality : A service that ensures that information is accessible to only
authorized entities.
• Integrity : A service that ensures that information and system modifications
can be done only by authorized entities.
• Authentication : A service that helps in assuring that the origin of a message
is correctly identified.
• Non-repudiation : A service that ensures that neither the sender nor the receiver
of a transmission can deny its actions.
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Symmetric key cryptography schemes are based on algorithms which use the same
key for encryption and decryption or where the decryption key is easily derivable from
the encryption key. These schemes are usually used for high speed data encryption.
However, the security of the scheme is entirely based on the secrecy of the key. One
also needs to ensure availability of means for the entities to agree on and exchange
keys in a secure manner, also referred to as the key distribution problem.
Public Key cryptography or asymmetric cryptography schemes consists of a set
of two keys - public key for encryption and private key for decryption. An encrypted
message can be sent by anyone to entity A, using A’s public key, but only A can
decrypt the message using its private key. A’s private key must be maintained secret.
The security of the scheme lies in the fact that it is impossible for anyone except A
to derive the private key from public key (at least in a reasonable amount of time).
The public key cryptography algorithms can be generally divided into three cate-
gories - algorithms based on integer factorization problem (RSA), algorithms based
on discrete logarithm problem (Diffie-Hellman), algorithms based on Elliptic curves
(ECC ). Regardless of the algorithm used, all of them perform complex and compu-
tationally intensive operations on very large numbers. The most common operation
in PKC is modular exponentiation, i.e., the calculation of xe mod n. Exponentiation
with large numbers, as required by PKC, is extremely arithmetically expensive.
The key distribution problem of symmetric key systems can be solved by using
asymmetric key schemes, but at the cost of expensive arithmetic computations. In
practice, cryptographic systems are usually a mix of symmetric key and asymmetric
key schemes. The former is used for encryption and data transfer, whereas the latter
is preferred for key establishment and authentication through digital signatures [9].
The basic principle of digital signature works as follows. If B wants to authenticate
A, A sends a message after encrypting with her secret private key. If the public key
of A which is known to B is capable of decrypting the encrypted message sent by A,
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B can authenticate that the message is from A. The validity of the public key of A is
commonly verified using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) via a Certificate Authority
(CA). Certificate authorities issues digital certificates, which binds public key to the
entities. When a CA issues a signed digital certificate to A, it allows B to trust the
public key of A, since B trusts the CA.
Implementing a combination of symmetric and asymmetric schemes is essential to
enable security in edge devices. In this work, we focus on the RSA algorithm, the
most prevalent asymmetric cryptographic scheme and design of a suitable hardware
accelerator enabling resource constrained devices to implement them with reasonable
performance.
1.2 Relevance of RSA
Even though Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) offers smaller key sizes and have
better memory, energy and bandwidth savings, RSA is still the most prevalent public-
key scheme in the Internet today. In many organizations, the RSA algorithm is used
for employee verification. Employees have chip based smart cards, which usually run
RSA in combination with some other algorithm to ensure security. One such product
is IDPrime MD 3811 smart cards, a single chip based dual interface smart card by
Gelmato, which is secured by both the RSA and ECC algorithms. It addresses a wide
range of use cases that require PKI security, including secure acesss, email encryption,
secure data storage, digital signatures and secure online transactions for end users
and has the ability to run RSA-2048 and generate on-card asymmetric RSA keys [10].
Another such product is IDPrime PIV (Personal Identity Verification) card v1.55 by
Gelmato which allows physical and logical access to Federal amenities for Federal
employees and was published as FIPS PUB - 201. It has the ability to run RSA
(1024-bit, 2048-bit) and on-card key pair generation [11].
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In [12], an end to end security protocol based on the RSA algorithm was proposed
for IoT devices. The authors have chosen RSA over ECC, since it is the dominant PKC
system and hence suitable infrastructure for obtaining certificates from certificate
authorities (CAs) are already in place. Also, in [13], it is mentioned that public key
signature validation is faster in RSA compared to ECC.
1.3 RSA Algorithm
Before delving into accelerator design, we look at the RSA algorithm in detail.
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is one of the commonly used public key cryptographic
algorithms. The strength of the RSA algorithm lies in the difficulty of factoring large
numbers. RSA involves three processes: Key generation, Encryption, Decryption.
Most commonly, after the RSA keys are generated in a device, say A, the public key
is distributed to the device, say B which wants to establish communication with A.
Private key is stored in the device A. The storage of key is a major security concern.
A more secure way is to generate the key as and when communication must to be
established. In this scheme, with the accelerator, the device should be capable of
supporting encryption, decryption and key generation.
1.3.1 RSA key generation
An RSA public key (n, e) consists of a modulus n and a public key exponent, e.
The modulus n, is calculated as the product of two positive prime integers p and q.
The size of an RSA key pair is considered to be the size of modulus n in bits. The
RSA private key corresponding to the public key (n, e) is (n, d), where d is the private
key exponent. The private key exponent d, depends on the public key exponent, e
and the modulus n [14].
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The RSA private key exponent d, the two positive prime integers p and q must
be kept as a secret to ensure security. Revealing the public key exponent e and the
modulus n does not compromise security and may be made known to anyone [14].
In NIST SP 800-57, it is specified that for use in RSA signature algorithms, the
recommended lengths for n are 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits as it can be seen from
table 1.1 [15]. The corresponding sizes of positive primes p and q are 512, 1024 and
1536 bits respectively. In this work, we consider key size to be 2048 and hence the
corresponding positive prime sizes to be 1024.
Algorithm security lifetime RSA key size
Through 2010 Min: k=1024
Through 2030 Min: k=2048
Beyond 2030 Min: k=3072
Table 1.1: Recommended minimum key size for RSA
According to the authors of the original paper [6], the following steps have to be
followed for calculating keys:
1. Choose two random prime numbers p and q
2. Calculate modulus n, using
n = p× q (1.1)
3. Calculate private key exponent d from p and q such that it satisfies,
gcd(d, (p− 1) · (q − 1)) = 1 (1.2)
4. Calculate private key exponent e from p, q, d to be the multiplicative inverse
of d, modulo(p-1).(q-1) i.e.,
e · d ≡ 1 · (mod(p− 1) · (q − 1)) (1.3)
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1.3.2 RSA encryption
The ciphertext, C is calculated by the following function where P is the plaintext,
(n,e) is the public key,
C = P e mod n (1.4)
1.3.3 RSA decryption
The plaintext, P is calculated by the following function where C is the ciphertext,
(n,d) is the private key,
P = Cd mod n (1.5)
1.4 RSA key generation in practice
Current implementations of RSA choose public key exponent, e and then compute
private key exponent d from it. The FIPS 186-4 specifies that the public key exponent
e can be selected with the following constraints [14]:
1. The public key exponent e can be selected prior to generating positive primes
p, q and the private key exponent d
2. The public key exponent can be an odd positive integer in the range,
216 < e < 2256
3. The public key exponent can be either a fixed or random value that satisfies
the constraint mentioned in 2.
After the selection of public key exponent, suitable primes p and q are selected
with the following constraints:
1. The positive primes p and q can be selected in such a way that (p − 1) and
(q − 1) are relatively prime to the public key exponent.
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2. The primes p and q should be selected randomly and should satisfy conditions,
(
√
2)(2(nlen/2)−1 ≤ p ≤ (2nlen/2 − 1)) (1.6)
(
√
2)(2(nlen/2)−1 ≤ q ≤ (2nlen/2 − 1)) (1.7)
3. The primes p and q should be such that,
|p− q| > 2(nlen/2)−100 (1.8)
The private key exponent d, is generated after the generation of primes p and q
with the following constraints,
1. The following inequality holds for d,
2(nlen/2) < d < LCM(p− 1, q − 1) (1.9)
2. The value of d should be such that,
d = e−1 mod (LCM(p− 1, q − 1)) (1.10)
It is convenient to use a small value of e for encryption purposes. 65537 is a popular
choice for e. In this work, we choose public key exponent as 65537 and choose the
primes p and q randomly such that the constraints mentioned above are satisfied.
The private key exponent, d is chosen such that equation 1.10 is satisfied.
1.5 Miller-Rabin Primality test
In RSA key generation, we observe that after selecting public key exponent, suit-
able primes numbers are generated such that it satisfies criteria mentioned in equation
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(1.6) and (1.7). Primality tests are usually used to generate prime numbers and they
can be broadly classified into three categories - probabilistic, deterministic and heuris-
tic. In probabilistic primality tests, a number is chosen randomly from a sample space
and checked whether some equality involving it is true. If the equality holds, to a
certain accuracy, the number is determined to be probably prime. Examples under
this category include Fermat test, Solovay-Strassen test and Miller-Rabin test [16].
Deterministic primality tests are capable of determining a number to be prime with
absolute certainty, but its running times are usually higher than probabilistic tests.
For generating primes suitable for the RSA key generation purposes, it is sufficient
to use Miller-Rabin test.
Algorithm 1 Miller-Rabin primality test [1]
Require: An odd integer n > 2 to be tested ; a positive integer t indicating number
of trials
Ensure: n is prime or composite
1: Find v and w such that n− 1 = 2v · w
2: for j ← 1 to t do
3: Choose random a such that 0 < a < n
4: Set b ← aw mod n
5: if b = 1 or n = 1 then
6: go to step 18
7: end if
8: for i ← 1 to v − 1 do
9: Set b ← b2 mod n
10: if b = n− 1 then
11: go to step 18
12: end if
13: if b = 1 then
14: Output ”Composite” and stop
15: end if
16: end for
17: Output ”Composite” and stop
18: Next j
19: end for
20: Output”Prime”
Natural numbers that are greater than 1 and cannot be formed as a product of
two smaller natural numbers are said to be prime. Natural numbers that are greater
13
k t k t k t
160 34 202-208 23 335-360 12
161-163 33 209-215 22 361-392 11
164-166 32 216-222 21 393-430 10
167-169 31 223-231 20 431-479 9
170-173 30 232-241 19 480-542 8
174-177 29 242-252 18 543-626 7
178-181 28 253-264 17 627-746 6
182-185 27 265-278 16 747-926 5
186-190 26 279-294 15 927-1232 4
191-195 25 295-313 14 1233-1853 3
196-201 24 314-334 13 1854-up 2
Table 1.2: Number of trials (t) of Miller-Rabin test to generate prime numbers of bit
size (k) with acceptable error probability [1]
than 1 and are not prime are known as composite numbers. The Miller-Rabin test
as given in Algorithm 1 [1] will determine if n, is prime or composite with a small
probability of error. To minimize the error probability, the Miller-Rabin test is run
multiple times. Usually an error probability less than 2−100 is accepted. To achieve
an error probability less than 2−100 for a 1024-bit positive integer n, the Miller Rabin
test has to be run at least 4 times [1] as can be seen from Table 1.2.
1.6 Montgomery arithmetic
Modular multiplication and modular exponentiation using repeated modular mul-
tiplication are operations most commonly used in Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
such as RSA and ECC. Implementing modular operations for Public Key Cryptog-
raphy is a great challenge for both hardware and software platforms, as it involves
computation with integers of large precision, for instance, 1024 bit integers for RSA.
Montgomery arithmetic [17] is usually used to implement such modular operations in
PKC. Montgomery arithmetic replaces expensive divisions with simple shift and add
operations.
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Let the modulus n be a k -bit integer. The Montgomery multiplication algorithm
calculates,
MM(a, b) = a · b · r−1 mod n (1.11)
where a and b are two integers such that a, b < n and r such that gcd(n, r) = 1.
Modular algorithm performs divisions by r, instead of n. Hence, r is usually chosen
to be a power of 2, as on general purpose computers, divisions by power of 2 is a
fast operation. We choose r to be 2k. If n is odd, then any power of 2 as r will be
relatively prime to n. r−1 is the inverse of r modulo n. Given two integers a, b and
modulus n, to compute t = a · b mod n using Montgomery method, the inputs a and
b are converted into Montgomery by calculating their respective n residues,
ā = a · r mod n
b̄ = b · r mod n
The Montgomery product of the two n-residues ā and b̄ will be,
c̄ = MM(ā, b̄)
c̄ = ā · b̄ · r−1 mod n
= a · r · b · r · r−1 mod n
= c · r mod n
In order to retrieve c from its n residue form, we compute the montgomery product
of c̄ with 1.
MM(c̄, 1) = c̄ · 1 · r−1 mod n
= c · r · r−1 mod n
= c mod n
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The generic Montgomery multiplication algorithm [18] is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Montgomery multiplication algorithm [18]
Ensure: MM(ā, b̄)
1: t ← ā · b̄
2: u ← (t+ (t · n� mod r) · n)/r
3: if u ≥ n then
4: return u− n
5: else
6: return u
7: end if
Modular multiplications and divisions with modulus r is very fast in comparison
to computations with modulus n, as the former involves only shift operations if r is
a power of 2. Conversion from integer to n residue, and vice versa are still time con-
suming, hence Montgomery method is not preferred for calculation of single modular
multiplication. Montgomery arithmetic is advantageous if a large number of modular
multiplications have to be performed with the same modulus consecutively, as is the
case for modular exponentiation. The generic Montgomery exponentiation algorithm
[18] for calculating x = ae mod n is given by Algorithm 3 below.
Algorithm 3 Montgomery Exponentiation algorithm [18]
Ensure: ME (a, e, n)
1: ā ← a · r mod n
2: x̄ ← 1 · r mod n
3: for i ← j − 1 to 0 do
4: x̄ ← MM(x̄, x̄)
5: if ei = 1 then
6: x̄ ← MM(x̄, ā)
7: end if
8: end for
9: x ← MM(x̄, 1)
10: return x
It is important to note that there are plenty of software and hardware implemen-
tations for Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation in the literature.
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Since the number of bits in a,b and n are usually too high to be processed as such
in processors, they are usually broken up into words and computations are done on a
word by word basis. However, from a system level perspective it is more feasible to
consider word based algorithms whose word size match the processor word size.
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CHAPTER 2
PERFORMANCE PROFILING OF RSA SYSTEM ON
EMBEDDED DEVICES
2.1 Determining hotspot function
Let us define HF Rate or Hotspot Function (bottleneck function) Rate of a function
to be the percentage of overall execution time that is dedicated to the function in
consideration. Amdahl’s law, given by,
Speedupoverall =
1
(1− Fractionenhanced) + FractionenhancedSpeedupenhanced
states that Speedupoverall can be observed in the overall algorithm, if a function,
which takes up Fractionenhanced portion of the overall algorithm, is improved by
Speedupenhanced. Note that HF Rate is equivalent to Fractionenhanced. If the HF
Rate of a function is too low, then the overall speedup cannot be significant even
if the performance of the function can be improved. The higher the HF Rate, the
higher would be the impact on overall speedup if the performance of the function
can be improved. However, the candidate for hotspot function should not be the
entire algorithm itself, as it would correspond to higher hardware area cost. Thus,
a function can be considered as a good candidate for hardware acceleration and can
be chosen as the hotspot function if it consumes substantial amount of the overall
execution time and has minimal hardware area [19].
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2.2 Methodology
In order to figure out a good candidate for acceleration, it is essential to find out
the runtime of different sections of the code. The runtime of a particular section of
the code is impacted not only by the time taken to run the particular code section
once, but also by the number of times the code section is ran.
In order to analyze the behaviour of RSA encryption, decryption and key genera-
tion algorithms, they are run in different platforms containing processors of varying
capabilities. One platform chosen is a Linux machine running an Intel Dual-Core
i5-4210U CPU @ 1.7GHz with 4GB memory. Another platform is a Raspberry Pi
3 Model B+ machine with a Broadcom BCM2837B0 Cortex-A53 (ARMv8) 64-bit
SoC @ 1.4GHz, 1GB LPDDR2 SDRAM. Another platform chosen is Nios II 32-bit
soft-core processor configured on an Altera FPGA in De2-i150 board, with on chip
memory of 400kB.
RSA Algorithms that are run in these platforms are taken from the mbedtls cryp-
tographic library which is an open source library written in C, available under Apache
2.0 License. The library contains algorithms which are lightweight, loosely coupled
and portable to multiple platforms [20].
2.3 Experiment 1 : RSA runtime analysis across platforms
RSA key generation, encryption and decryption are run repeatedly in the three
platforms mentioned to determine the average time taken to complete the operations.
In Intel Linux machine and ARM Raspberry Pi, the operations were run 1000 times
whereas in the Nios II processor the operations were run 50 times. The results
obtained are tabulated in Table 2.1.
A number of observations could be made from the results. In Intel Linux machine,
the time taken to complete operations are in milliseconds, whereas in ARM Raspberry
Pi it takes time an order of magnitude more than the Intel Linux machine. Similarly
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Operation Intel(ms) Rasp Pi(ms) NiosII(ms)
Encryption 0.47 3.73 95
Decryption 5.73 93.76 2621
Key generation 251.99 9453.68 102100
Table 2.1: RSA runtime analysis across platforms
in Nios II processor, it takes time atleast an order of magnitude more than the ARM
Raspberry Pi. As the processing power of the platform decreases, the performance of
the RSA operations also decreases, as it can be observed in fig 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Performance across platforms
Time distribution of RSA operations across platforms is given in pie charts in
figures 2.2, figure 2.3 and figure 2.4. If time taken by all RSA operations is assumed
to be x, it can be seen that on average, 98 percentage of x is consumed by key
generation, 1.9 percentage of x is consumed by decryption and 0.1 percentage of x is
consumed by encryption.
The RSA algorithm is commonly used for session key distribution and digital
signature verification, where the plaintext or message (which is usually a key to
be used for data encryption) length is short. In addition to this, our application, in
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particular, demands a new set of keys for each session. Hence, the overall RSA process
is key generation to generate a new pair of keys, encryption or decryption involving
message of short length. For other applications, key generation may not take place
per session and hence key generation could amortize encryption/decryption.
Figure 2.2: Time distribution for RSA operations - Intel Linux
Figure 2.3: Time distribution for RSA operations - ARM Raspberry Pi
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Figure 2.4: Time distribution for RSA operations - Nios II
2.4 Experiment 2 : Analyzing RSA key generation runtime
From 2.1, it can be seen that key generation takes up 98% of time and this
algorithm has to be analyzed for selecting a good hotspot candidate.
The key generation algorithm is first analyzed to determine potential candidates.
Key generation algorithm is given in section 1.3.1. In practice, however, the algorithm
is carried out in a different manner as mentioned in section 1.4. The public verification
exponent e is selected prior to generating the primes, p and q and the private signature
exponent d. As in common practice, the e value is chosen to be 65537.
The number of calls to the primality test algorithm when the key generation
algorithm is run 1000 times is tabulated in Table 2.2. It is observed that in order to
generate suitable prime numbers p and q, primality test has to be run a large number
of times and it occupies a significant portion of the key generation algorithm.
RSA key generation algorithm is run 1000 times and the time taken for suitable
prime generation is measured and reported in Table 2.3. The RSA key generation is
run 1000 times to enable profiling. In those 1000 runs, on an average the number of
calls to RSA ke y generation is 1, suitable prime generation is 2, and the primality
test algorithm is 115. Calculation of modulus from suitable primes, computation of
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Intel Linux Raspberry Pi
Function Number of calls Average Number of calls Average
RSA key generation 1000 1 1000 1
Suitable prime generation 2000 2 2000 2
Primality tests 115150 115.2 114672 114.7
Table 2.2: Number of calls to primality test
private key exponent take negligible amount of time, less than one percentage, as
compared to generation of suitable primes.
Platform Suitable Prime gen. Key gen. Percentage
Intel 0.251 ms 0.252 ms 99.48
Raspberry Pi 9.42 ms 9.45 ms 99.68
Nios 101.65 s 102.1 s 99.56
Table 2.3: Key generation analysis
Across platforms, almost 99.573% of the key generation time is taken for suitable
prime generation. This percentage dependency goes higher as the time taken for key
generation increases as it can be seen from from figures 2.5 and 2.6. Thus, it can be
concluded that speeding up suitable prime number generation will help speed up the
key generation process.
2.5 Experiment 3 : Analyzing suitable prime generation run-
time
The Miller-Rabin prime number generation algorithm is used to check if num-
bers generated randomly are prime according to Algorithm 1. Once numbers are
determined to be prime, they are checked to determine if they satisfy the inequalties
mentioned in equations 1.6, 1,7 and 1.8. Until they do so, the Miller-Rabin prime
generation algorithm is run over and over again to generate prime numbers p and
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Figure 2.5: Time taken for suitable prime generation vs time taken for key generation
in Intel Linux machine
Figure 2.6: Time taken for suitable prime generation vs time taken for key generation
in Raspberry Pi
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q that satisfy this criteria. The suitable prime generation algorithm which involves
cycles of generation of primes using Miller-Rabin algorithm and checking of primes
for suitability with selected public key exponent is profiled using a profiling tool to
aid in the determination of hotspot function. If multiple rounds of Miller Rabin are
to be avoided, p and q could be chosen first, and then the modulus, and then e or d
determined. This is adopted in the original RSA key genration algorithm, as detailed
in section 1.3.1. However, in practice, e is chosen to be 65537, a fixed value [14]. With
e as 65537, which is 10000000000000001 in binary, it makes the RSA encryption or
signature verification process easier for computation. Having a fixed public key ex-
ponent value of 65537 does not have security implications. If RSA key generation
algorithm in practice is adopted, which is detailed in section 1.4, multiple rounds of
Miller Rabin cannot be avoided.
Since the mbedtls library is loosely coupled, the algorithm is composed of smaller
functions, making it easier for analysis purposes. We use a popular profiling tool
GNU Profiler or gprof to analyze a program and determine where the key generation
program spends its time. To generate profile information for our program, the pro-
gram is compiled and linked with profiling enabled using -pg option while running
the compiler.
gprof provides information about a program in the form of Flat profile and Call
graph. Flat profile gives information about the time spent in executing each function
by displaying percentage of total execution time the function takes (% time), time
taken by the function in seconds (self seconds), and total number calls to the function
(calls) among other fields for each function. The call graph provides information
on which function (parent function) calls which other function (child function), the
number of times it is called (called), the time taken by the function (self) and its
children(children). It helps in determining if the time is spent in the function itself,
or if the time is spent in executing its subroutines or children functions.
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Figure 2.7: Function execution time
Information from the profiling tool, reveals the top functions that consume the
most amount of time to be :
1. mbedtls rsa key gen : This function is called to compute a pair of 2048-bit
RSA keys for a public key exponent value 65537.
2. mbedtls mpi gen prime : This function generates suitable prime numbers for a
public key exponent value of 65537. It is a child function ofmbedtls rsa gen key.
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Figure 2.8: Function execution time Intel
Figure 2.9: Function execution time Raspberry Pi
3. mbedtls mpi is prime : This function checks if the given number is prime or
not, first by checking for small factors and then by running Miller-Rabin pri-
mality test. It is a child function of mbedtls mpi gen prime.
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4. mpi miller rabin : This function implements the Miller Rabin primality test
for a given integer and determine if the given integer is prime or not. Since
generating 2048-bit keys require 1024-bit prime numbers, the input for Miller-
Rabin primality test will be a 1024-bit integer.
5. mbedtls mpi exp mod : This function performs 1024-bit modular exponentia-
tion and is a child function of mpi miller rabin.
6. mpi mul hlp : This function performs the operation given below.
for j ← 0 to s− 1 do
(C, t[j]) ← t[j] + x[j] ∗ Y + C
end for
The function aids in multi-precision multiplication and multi-precision Mont-
gomery modular multiplication and hence is called by two functions, namely,
mbedtls mpi mul mpi andmpi montmul. mpi montmul is responsible for 99.74%
of calls in Intel Linux machine and 96.15% of calls in Raspberry Pi.
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis for various functions - Intel Linux
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7. mpi montmul : This function performs Montgomery modular multiplication for
1024-bit integers. This is a child function of mpi montred, which is used to im-
plement Montgomery reduction and a child function of mbedtls mpi exp mod.
Figure 2.11: Sensitivity Analysis for various functions - Raspberry Pi
Time taken by a function can be due to the function itself (self execution time)
and/or due to the children functions. A good candidate for hotspot function will be
a function which has a high self execution time. The most time consuming functions
listed above were profiled to determine the function that has the highest self execution
time. mpi mul hlp was found to have the highest self execution time as evident from
figures 2.8 and 2.9. The values have been tabulated in 2.4. Other functions listed
were observed to be parent functions of the mpi mul hlp.
Sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the performance improvement that
would be observed on the overall algorithm for various speedup factors for candidate
hotspot functions. Each of the function is expected to improve by 10%, 20% , 50%,
100% etc, and the impact on the overall algorithm is computed in the sensitivity
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Intel Linux Raspberry Pi
Function Name Incl.time(%) Self time(%) Incl.time(%) Self time(%)
mbedtls rsa gen key 100 0 99.6 2.66 ×10-5
mbedtls mpi gen prime 99.5 10.5 ×10-4 99 7.45 ×10-4
mbedtls mpi is prime 98.7 10.5 ×10-4 98.6 2.4 ×10-4
mpi miller rabin 96.8 0 98.3 7.45 ×10-4
mbedtls mpi exp mod 96.4 0.23 96.3 0.052
mpi mul hlp 92.8 92.8 94.8 94.8
mpi montmul 95.8 1.41 94.3 1.74
mbedtls mpi div mpi 0.6 0.015 4 0.013
mbedtls mpi mod mpi 0.6 0 4 1.32 ×10-4
mbedtls mpi mul mpi 0.3 0.029 3.8 0.042
mbedtls mpi mul int 0.3 0.008 3.7 0.002
mpi sub hlp 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4
mpi check small factors 1.9 0.013 0.3 0.005
mbedtls mpi mod int 1.8 1.8 0.2 0.2
Table 2.4: Function execution time - inclusive and self
analysis process. For both the platforms, for all values of speedup, the mpi mul hlp
function standouts to have the most impact on the overall algorithm as it can be seen
from figures 2.10 and 2.11. The hotspot function is determined to be the operation
executed by mpi mul hlp.
Thus, the RSA algorithm is profiled and bottleneck identification is complete. The
function implemented by mpi mul hlp is determined to be the bottleneck for RSA
algorithm and is chosen to be most suited for hardware acceleration.
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CHAPTER 3
ACCELERATOR DESIGN
In this chapter, the system level considerations for accelerator design and their
relevance are discussed. The design approach adopted in this work, the accelerator
architecture proposed and the architectures used for comparison are also discussed.
Some previous works on Montgomery multipliers for reconfigurable hardware are also
summarized in this chapter.
3.1 System level considerations for accelerator design
Accelerators are nothing but the hardware components designed to execute a spe-
cific functionality in an SoC. They are capable of improving performance (by 10-100x)
and lowering energy consumption (by 100-1000x) as compared to software implemen-
tations in processors [21]. Implementation in hardware leads to faster systems, how-
ever, implementation in software is cheaper and keeps the design flexible. Design
of an SoC system with accelerator begins with functional specification of the entire
system allowing for a functional verification. It then proceeds to partitioning design
into hardware and software while accounting for performance, cost and flexibility.
The microarchitecture of a typical accelerator is given in figure 3.1[2]. It consists
of a data-path and a controller. Controller is a finite state machine which controls the
execution of the desired accelerator function based on a set of conditions. It controls
execution of operations in the hardware resources, also called the datapath, in a
given clock cycle. The datapath operate on data obtained from memory either local
or external. The accelerator proposed in this work has a similar microarchitecture
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where the data for the accelerator is stored in a memory external to the accelerator.
Since the accelerator implements a sequential design, the control of the datapath to
generate a Montgomery product is split between the accelerator and the processor.
Accelerators can be located either inside the processing core (tightly-coupled) or
outside (loosely-coupled).
Figure 3.1: Microarchitecture of a typical accelerator [2]
State of the art accelerators use scratchpad memory and Direct Memory Access
to provide fixed-latency data transfer and memory access. Typically it is observed
that On-chip memory consumes about 40-90% of accelerator area. DMA engines
are responsible for moving data between general purpose cores and accelerators [22].
Loosely-coupled accelerators are suitable for computation on large-data sets while
tightly coupled accelerators are for fine-grain computations on small data sets.
To account for increasing complexity of SoCs and the accelerators, design effort
should shift from RTL or Register Transistor Level Design to System Level Design.
The system constraints play a vital role in deciding design of the accelerator and
eventually overall performance.
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Consider a scenario in which an accelerator datapath is capable of processing
data at a rate that is faster than the rate in which data can be transferred over
the system interconnect. In such a case, the logic area in the accelerator is not
put to optimal use, which could be rectified by a change in the hardware resources
by increasing memory or by changing the architecture of the accelerator in order
to be more suitable for system specifications. Variations in software code leading
to slightly different versions of the hotspot function should also be considered before
narrowing down an architecture to be suitable for hardware acceleration for the system
environment. For instance, let us consider that the function to be accelerated is given
be f(x, y, z, a, b) = x+ y+ z+ a+ b. Assume two possible architectures for hardware
accelerators,
a1(m,n) = m+ n
a2(m,n, o) = m+ n+ o
Depending on the accelerator architecture chosen, f(x, y, z, a, b) could be calcu-
lated by running the accelerator twice or four times. This demonstrates how change in
software code on the processor is required depending on the accelerator architecture.
The system might be capable of transferring 2 inputs or 3 inputs per clock cycle to the
accelerator, depending on which the accelerator architecture could be chosen. This
demonstrates how change in the system constraints can affect the choice of accelerator
architecture.
More often than not, system constraints are disregarded while designing hardware
accelerators, leading to non-optimal designs or under-performance. In order to obtain
an optimal design, the design space should be analyzed to optimize the architecture
of an accelerator and evaluate different trade-offs in terms of performance and costs.
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3.2 Hotspot function and relation to Montgomery multipli-
cation
Figure 3.2: Minimal architecture to implement mpi mul hlp (left) and block repre-
sentation (right)
The mpi mul hlp function is given in the following algorithm.
for j ← 0 to s− 1 do
(C, t[j]) ← t[j] + x[j] ∗ Y + C
end for
From the experiments in the previous chapters, we observe that mpi montmul
function is responsible for almost 97.98% of calls tompi mul hlp function. It forms the
inner loop of the word based Montgomery multiplication algorithms. If mpi mont mul
can be represented diagramatically by the block diagram shown in 3.3, thenmpi mul hlp
represents a row of operation.
mpi mul hlp function directly corresponds to inner j loops of CIOS (Coarsely
Integrated Operand Scanning) algorithm [18]. The CIOS Montgomery multiplication
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is a word based modular multiplication technique where the large integers are broken
into smaller words of bit length usually same as the processor word size. The inner
loop 1 corresponding to lines 3 to 6 of Algorithm 5 and inner loop 2 corresponding to
lines 12 to 15 of Algorithm 5 implement the same algorithm but on different inputs.
The generic inner loop is given in Algorithm 6.
If to be implemented sequentially, the minimal hardware architecture that can
perform this operation would be a multiplier unit followed by and adder unit capable
of adding 2 single precision number to the result of multiplication which is of double
precision. The architecture required to implement the same can be represented by a
block as shown in 3.2.
3.3 Previous works
In order to implement RSA systems on hardware, many previous works have
proposed Montgomery implementations on FPGAs [23], [24], [25], [26], [27] . The
Montgomery multiplication algorithm, introduced by Peter Montgomery in 1985, is
based on a series of addition and shift operation and it replaces the cumbersome trial
division by modulus method to compute modular multiplication. There are many
variants of Montgomery multiplication algorithms - radix 2, systolic, higher radix
implementations. A lot of previous works have focused on Montgomery multipliers
as stand alone circuits.
When working with long operands for RSA (typically of size 1024 or 2048 bits),
the performance is affected by long carry propagation. Previous works on Modular
exponentiation using Montgomery multiplication have made use of carry save format
to avoid long carry propagation delays. In these works, the inputs and outputs are
represented in binary form, but the intermediate results are in in carry-save format
which necessitates format conversion at the end of each multiplication. In other cases
like [28], the inputs and outputs are maintained in carry-save format, and conversion
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to binary is performed only to obtain the final result of modular exponentiation at
the expense of additional registers to store intermediate operands. In [28], an im-
plementation to reduce hardware resources have been proposed with focus on final
output conversion circuit to convert form CSA to binary form. Instead of 1024 bit
CPA (Carry Propagation adders), a 32-bit CPA is used, with shift registers to feed
input values to the same. The Montgomery multiplication however still works on
the entire n − bit operands with 2 double CSAs generating result in CSA format in
n clock cycles. In [29], a complexity effective multiplier version has been proposed,
which stores intermediate results from one adder to a look up table which feeds a
CSA adder structure. In all of these designs, the adders to facilitate multiplication
are the same size as operand length n. In [30], 128 and 256 bit CIOS (Coarsely
Integrated Operand Scanning) architecture was implemented in Xilinx Virtex2 fam-
ily of FPGAs and compared with FIOS (Finely Integrated Operand Scanning), SOS
(Separated Operand Scanning) architecture implementations for area and through-
put. In [31], a parametric design, for modular multiplication, exponentiation and
prime tester is mentioned. The algorithm, which is tunable and scalable to meet the
area/speed requirements operates on individual bits of the operands. In [32], energy
efficient architecture using BRFA(Barrel Register Full adder) and clock gating tech-
nique is suggested. They propose a modified MM42 architecture using double carry
save adder structure for 1024 bit radix-2 multiplication with additional circuitry for
lookup logic(LU), superfluous CSA and register write operation bypassing. Most of
these works have focused on Register Transfer Level design, disregarding system level
considerations.
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3.4 Word based Montgomery multiplication algorithm for
accelerator
A generic Montgomery Multiplication algorithm is given in Algorithm 4. Line 1
of Algorithm 4 represents integer multiplication. The rest accomplishes Montgomery
reduction. In the generic algorithm, the operands are of length 1024 bits.
Algorithm 4 Montgomery multiplication algorithm [18]
Ensure: MM(ā, b̄)
1: t ← ā · b̄
2: u ← (t+ (t · n� mod r) · n)/r
3: if u ≥ n then
4: return u− n
5: else
6: return u
7: end if
From a system level perspective, we propose that accelerators that are tightly
coupled with the processor work best with word based multiplication methods. The
focus of this work is on accelerating word based Montgomery multiplication methods.
Since the operand size is of multiple precision, they are split into words of single
precision. In a processor, any operation on this multi-precision operands would involve
computations on single precision words which are then combined together to obtain
the final result. Since the processor is capable of operating only in terms of words, it
is desirable that an accelerator that works closely with the processor also implement
word based algorithms.
Suppose the processor word size is 8 bits. A 1024 bit operand is now split into 128
words. If the accelerator is such that it is capable of operating on all of 1024 bits, then
the accelerator is stalled for 128 * x cycles, where x is the delay in transferring single
operand word to the accelerator. However, with word based algorithms, computation
can begin as soon as the lower precision words (word based algorithms usually start
computation with lower precision words) of the operands are made available. Word
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based algorithms also generate results in word-units incrementally, thus not stalling
the processor to wait for result until the complete or final result (multi-precision
number) is computed.
3.4.1 Representing Montgomery word based algorithm
The modulus n is a k -bit integer where 2k−1 ≤ n ≤ 2k and r is 2k. In order
to compute Montgomery reduction algorithm, n� is required which is obtained by
r · r−1−n ·n� = 1. In all word based algorithms the operands a, b and the modulus n
are r bit integers. They are split into s words, where w is the word size. The radix W
is 2w, where r = 2sw. In all word based algorithms, a word of a multiprecision integer
is represented by its index. For instance a[0] represents lowest significant word of a.
The data flow and data path of a four word Montgomery multiplication is shown
in 3.3. White boxes represent operations for integer multiplication. Shaded boxes
represent operations for Montgomery reduction. Assume a and b are multi-precision
integers, where a consists of four words indexed by j: a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3]and b consists
of four words indexed by i : b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3]. White box represents multiplication
of words of a and b represented by their indices, and addition of inputs tin, cin
generating outputs tout and cout. Shaded box represents montgomery reduction min
and n�[j] are multiplied generating tin, cin generating outputs tout and cout. min which
can be calculated from t[0] and n�[0]. Adding the partial results of all the boxes, the
Montgomery product can be obtained by keeping the upper half of the final result.
There are different sequential implementation schemes for Montgomery multipli-
cation which gives rise to various word based algorithms. The difference in these
methods comes from the sequence to calculate boxes. If the white boxes are calcu-
lated first, and then the all the shaded boxes, row-wise, then it is called Seperated
Operand Scanning (SOS) method. If a row of white boxes are calculated and then
a row of shaded boxes are calculated then it is called Coarsely Integrated Operand
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Figure 3.3: Block diagram representing dataflow of Montgomery multiplication.
White box represents integer multiplication block. Shaded box represents mont-
gomery reduction block [3]
scanning (CIOS) method. If a white box is calculated and then a shaded box is
calculated, it is called Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) Method.
3.5 Accelerator design approach
Minimal datapath circuit to implement the mpi mul hlp includes multiplication
of two single precision words followed by addition of the result to 2 single precision
words. This operation is generally termed as ’Multiply accumulate’ and is prevalent
in cryptographic algorithms. Some works have considered instruction set extensions
to include Multiply Accumulate (MULACC) instruction on MSP430, ATMega, Cor-
texM0+ to facilitate this operation [33], [34], [35].
In designing the accelerator, one aims to look for hardware that is slightly more so-
phisticated and higher in functionality than the minimal architecture for mpi mul hlp
and is capable of accelerating the montgomery multiplication method and in effect
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the overall RSA key generation operation. The accelerator design proposed in this
work satisfies this criteria. We introduce an algorithm to implement Montgomery
multiplication and the minimal architecture required to implement the same. The
accelerator hardware in consideration can be equated to the loop body of the word-
based algorithms. The loop body is iterated a number of times with different inputs
to implement the algorithm. Similarly, the accelerator has to be run multiple times
to complete one round of Montgomery multiplication. The processor is responsible
to provide appropriate inputs to the accelerator to facilitate this. The datapath to
compute Montgomery multiplication belongs to the accelerator, while the control
circuitry is split between the processor and the accelerator.
Throughout this study, we focus on operand scanning methods, since the hard-
ware for operand scanning methods are the most suited for hardware implementa-
tion, due to its uniform structure. We analyze our proposed design with similar and
comparable architectures capable of implementing other word based algorithms like
CIOS (Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning) method and FIOS (Finely Integrated
Operand Scanning Method).
Keeping the system level constraints in mind, we compare the designs in terms
of area, latency in completing a Montgomery multiplication operation under input
availability constraints. We assume the accelerators to have 2, 3 and 4 ports to
transfer operands in and out of the accelerator and compare their performance in
each case.
In the following sections, we analyze the CIOS, FIOS and proposed algorithm
and describe the architecture of accelerators that implement CIOS, FIOS and the
proposed algorithm.
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3.6 Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) algorithm
The CIOS algorithm is given in Algorithm 5. The algorithm obtains its name as
it alternates between iterations of computing a row of integer multiplication followed
by a row of montgomery reduction.
Algorithm 5 CIOS Algorithm [18]
1: for i ← 0 to s− 1 do
2: C ← 0
3: for j ← 0 to s− 1 do � Inner Loop 1
4: (C, S) ← t[j] + a[j] ∗ b[i] + C
5: t[j] ← S
6: end for
7: (C, S) ← t[s] + C
8: t[s] ← S
9: t[s+ 1] ← C
10: C ← 0
11: m ← t[0] ∗ n�[0] mod W
12: for j ← 0 to s− 1 do � Inner Loop 2
13: (C, S) ← t[j] +m ∗ n[j] + C
14: t[j] ← S
15: end for
16: (C, S) ← t[s] + C
17: t[s] ← S
18: t[s+ 1] = t[s+ 1] + C
19: for j ← 0 to s do
20: t[j] ← t[j + 1]
21: end for
22: end for
Algorithm 6 Inner Loop of CIOS Algorithm
1: for j ← 0 to s− 1 do
2: (C, S) ← t[j] + x[j] ∗ y + C
3: t[j] ← S
4: end for
The minimal accelerator architecture to facilitate CIOS algorithm is given in fig-
ure 3.6. It consists of 2 multiplier units and associated adder units to compute
partial products of first two indices in parallel. Using block diagram representation of
dataflow as shown in figure 3.4, one can see that using the architecture, computation
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Precision Word size = 8 bit Word size = 16 bit Word size = 32 bit Word size = w bit
Number
of words
1024 / 8 = 128 1024/ 16 = 64 1024 / 32 = 32 1024 / w = s
Number
of word-wise multiplications
for Integer multiplication
64 (2 8 bit * 8bit ) blocks
* 128 iterations
32 (2 16 bit * 16 bit ) blocks
* 64 iterations
16 (2 32 bit * 32 bit ) blocks
* 32 iterations
s/2 ( 2 w bit * w bit ) blocks
* s iterations
Number
of word-wise multiplications
for Montgomery reduction
64 (2 8 bit * 8bit ) blocks
* 128 iterations
32 (2 16 bit * 16 bit ) blocks
* 64 iterations
16 (2 32 bit * 32 bit ) blocks
* 32 iterations
s/2 ( 2 w bit * w bit ) blocks
* s iterations
Table 3.1: Number of word-wise multiplications for Montgomery multiplication using
CIOS accelerator
Figure 3.4: Block diagram representing dataflow of CIOS Montgomery multiplication
can proceed in 2 block units at a time. If integer multiplication (or montgomery
reduction) is being computed, the 2 blocks compute integer multiplication (or mont-
gomery reduction) results for consecutive indexes of a row in a concurrent manner.
The inputs required for CIOS loop accelerator are 2 words of a, 1 word of b and
2 words of t in Algorithm 6 and from figure 3.5. It produces 2 words of t as outputs.
For the subsequent iteration/operation in the same row, the word b remains constant,
but it requires 2 new words of a, and 2 new words of t.
The operations involved for one iteration are read of 2 words of a, 2 words of t,
2 word-multiplications, 2 3-word additions, storing results in 4 registers C1, S1, C0,
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Figure 3.5: Dataflow in CIOS accelerator across iterations (Operations)
Figure 3.6: Architecture for CIOS accelerator
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S0 write of 2 words of t. Result of one word (w bits) multiplications result in upto a
two word (2w bits) long result. Addition of multiplication result to two w bits words
can only be upto 2w bits or two words long.
If the word size is assumed to be w, then the number of words for a multi-precision
operand would be 1024/w = s. To compute a single row of integer multiplication or
montgomery reduction, the architecture has to be iterated s/2 times, since 2 blocks
are computed at the same time. This has to be repeated s times to compute all rows
required to compute Montgomery multiplication. The detailed analysis is shown in
3.1.
3.7 Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) algorithm
The algorithm for the FIOS Montgomery multiplication is given in Algorithm 7.
The algorithm obtains its name as it alternates between iterations of computing a
block of integer multiplication followed by a block of montgomery reduction for a
particular index.
Algorithm 7 FIOS Algorithm
1: for i ← 0 to s− 1 do
2: (C, S) ← t[0] + a[0] ∗ b[i]
3: t[1] ← t[1] + C
4: m ← S ∗ n�[0] mod W
5: (C, S) ← S +m ∗ n[0]
6: for j ← 1 to s− 1 do
7: (C, S) ← t[j] + a[j] ∗ b[i] + C
8: t[j + 1] ← t[j + 1] + C
9: (C, S) ← S +m ∗ n[j]
10: t[j − 1] ← S
11: end for
12: (C, S) ← t[s] + C
13: t[s− 1] ← S
14: t[s] ← t[s+ 1] + C
15: t[s+ 1] ← 0
16: end for
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Figure 3.7: Block diagram representing dataflow of FIOS Montgomery multiplication
Figure 3.8: Dataflow in FIOS accelerator across iterations (Operations)
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Figure 3.9: Architecture for FIOS accelerator
The minimal accelerator architecture to facilitate FIOS algorithm is given in figure
3.9. It consists of 2 multiplier units and associated adder units to compute partial
products of integer multiplication and montgomery reduction of first index in parallel.
Using block diagram representation of dataflow as shown in figure 3.7, one can see
that using the architecture, computation can proceed in 2 block units at a time. For
a particular index, the integer multiplication and montgomery reduction could be
computed concurrently.
The inputs required for FIOS loop accelerator are 1 word of a, 1 word of b, 1 word
of m, 1 word of n and 1 word of t as shown in figure 3.8. It produces 1 word of t as
output. For the subsequent iteration/operation in the same row, the word b and n
remain constant, but it requires new words of a, n and t.
The operations involved for one iteration are read of 1 word of a, 1 word of n, 1
word of t, 2 word-multiplications, 2 3-word additions, storing results in 4 registers C1,
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Precision Word size = 8 bit Word size = 16 bit Word size = 32 bit Word size = w bit
Number
of words
1024 / 8 = 128 1024 / 16 = 64 1024 / 32 = 32 1024 / w = s
Number
of word-wise multiplications
for Integer multiplication
+
Montgomery
reduction
128
(2 8 bit * 8bit ) blocks
* 128 iterations
64
(2 16 bit * 16 bit ) blocks
* 64 iterations
32
(2 32 bit * 32 bit ) blocks
* 32 iterations
s
(2 w bit * w bit ) blocks
* s iterations
Table 3.2: Number of word-wise multiplications for Montgomery multiplication using
FIOS accelerator
Precision Word size = 8 bit Word size = 16 bit Word size = 32 bit Word size = w bit
Number
of words
1024 / 8 = 128 1024 / 16 = 64 1024 / 32 = 32 1024 / w = s
Number
of word-wise multiplications
for Integer multiplication
64 (2 8 bit * 8bit ) blocks
* 128 iterations
32 (2 16 bit * 16 bit ) blocks
* 64 iterations
16 (2 32 bit * 32 bit ) blocks
* 32 iterations
s/2
( 2 w bit * w bit ) blocks
* s iterations
Number
of word-wise multiplications
for Montgomery reduction
64 (2 8 bit * 8bit ) blocks
* 128 iterations
32 (2 16 bit * 16 bit ) blocks
* 64 iterations
16 (2 32 bit * 32 bit ) blocks
* 32 iterations
s/2
( 2 w bit * w bit ) blocks
* s iterations
Table 3.3: Number of word-wise multiplications for Montgomery multiplication using
proposed accelerator
S1, C0, S0 write of 2 words of t. Result of one word (w bits) multiplications result
in upto a two word (2w bits) long result. Addition of multiplication result to two w
bits words can only be upto 2w bits or two words long.
If the word size is assumed to be w, then the number of words for a multi-precision
operand would be 1024/w = s. Since a row of integer multiplication and montgomery
reduction are computed in parallel the accelerator has to be iterated s times, since
2 blocks - one for integer multiplication and one for reduction need to be computed
at the same time. This has to be repeated s times to compute all rows required to
compute Montgomery multiplication. The detailed analysis is shown in table 3.2.
3.8 Proposed design
The algorithm proposed is given in Algorithm 5. Instead of alternating between it-
erations of computing a row of integer multiplication followed by a row of montgomery
reduction, we compute 2 rows of integer multiplication or montgomery reduction at
the same time.
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Algorithm 8 Proposed Algorithm
1: for i ← 0 to s− 1 by 2 do
2: C ← 0
3: C1 ← 0
4: for j ← 0 to s− 1 do � Inner Loop 1
5: (C, S) ← t[j] + a[j] ∗ b[i] + C
6: t[j] ← S
7: (C1, S1) ← t[j + 1] + a[j] ∗ b[i+ 1] + C1
8: t[j + 1] ← S1
9: end for
10: (C, S) ← t[s] + C
11: t[s] ← S
12: t[s+ 1] ← C
13: (C1, S1) ← t[s+ 1] + C1
14: t[s+ 1] ← S1
15: t[s+ 2] ← C1
16: C,C1 ← 0
17: m0 ← t[0] ∗ n�[0] mod W
18: for j ← 0 to s− 1 do � Inner Loop 2
19: (C, S) ← t[j] +m0 ∗ n[j] + C
20: t[j] ← S
21: if j = 0 then
22: x ← t[1] +m0 ∗ n[1] + C
23: m1 ← x ∗ n�[0] mod W
24: end if
25: (C1, S1) ← t[j + 1] +m1 ∗ n[j] + C1
26: t[j + 1] ← S1
27: end for
28: (C, S) ← t[s] + C
29: t[s] ← S
30: t[s+ 1] ← t[s+ 1] + C
31: (C1, S1) ← t[s+ 1] + C1
32: t[s+ 1] ← S1
33: t[s+ 2] ← t[s+ 2] + C1
34: for j ← 0 to s+ 2 do
35: t[j] ← t[j + 2]
36: end for
37: end for
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Figure 3.10: Block diagram representing dataflow of proposed algorithm for Mont-
gomery multiplication
Figure 3.11: Architecture for proposed accelerator
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The minimal accelerator architecture to facilitate the proposed algorithm is given
in figure 3.11. It consists of 2 multiplier units and associated adder units to compute
partial products of first two indices across 2 rows in parallel. Using block diagram
representation of dataflow as shown in figure 3.10, one can see that using the archi-
tecture, computation can proceed in 2 block units at a time. If integer multiplication
(or montgomery reduction) is being computed, the 2 blocks compute integer multi-
plication (or montgomery reduction) results for consecutive indexes in a concurrent
manner.
The inputs required for the proposed accelerator are 1 word of a, 2 words of b
and 2 words of t in Algorithm 8 and from figure 3.10. It produces 1 word of t as
output. For the subsequent iteration/operation in the same row, the words b remains
constant, but it requires 1 new word of a, and 1 new word of t.
The operations involved for one iteration are read of 1 word of a, 1 word of t,
2 word-multiplications, 2 3-word additions, 1 4-word addition storing results in 6
registers C2, S2, C1, S1, C0, S0 and write of 1 word of t. Result of one word (w bits)
multiplications result in upto a two word (2w bits) long result. Addition of the upto
4 words cannot exceed 2w bits.
If the word size is assumed to be w, then the number of words for a multi-precision
operand would be 1024/w = s. To compute 2 row of integer multiplication or mont-
gomery reduction, the architecture has to be iterated s times, since 2 blocks are
computed at the same time. This has to be repeated s/2 times to compute all rows
required to compute Montgomery multiplication. The detailed analysis is shown in
3.3.
We observe that in the loop function for montgomery reduction, the first iteration
with loop iterator j as 0, the value of m1 is determined after calculation of t[0] and C.
This is because the second row of the Montgomery reduction requires the value m1,
which can be calculated only after the lower 2 blocks of the first row are calculated. In
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order to transfer the inputs required to calculate m1 to the processor, if the accelerator
has to be used, then the accelerator, could be run for 2 iterations by setting m1 value
to be 0, so that x can be calculated and transferred to the processor. If the number of
iterations of the accelerator block is s/2 * s iterations, then the additional computation
needs to be done for 2 * s/2 which is s iterations, thus increasing the total iterations
by s.
The discussion of accelerator architectures to be analyzed is complete. In the next
chapter the experimental setup, results and observations made while comparing the
architectures are discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTS, ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 Design space exploration of accelerator using high level
synthesis
High level synthesis facilitates effective design space exploration of hardware ar-
chitectures and helps in improving design productivity for hardware designers. High
level synthesis is an automated design process that aids in transforming high level
specification usually implemented in C/C++ or SystemC to optimized hardware so-
lutions. It provides the opportunity for a designer to consider various architectural
solutions without altering the high level specification. The main idea behind HLS
is to generate different RTL implementations by raising the abstraction level of the
design process. By setting the optimization directives (also known as knobs) provided
by HLS, a designer can explore alternative RTL implementation for the same high
level specification. Some standard knobs provided by HLS tools are given in table
4.1.
Knob Settings and Effects
Loop Manipulations
Unrolling: Replicates operations in loop body
Pipelining: Pipelines the operations in the loop body
Breaking: Inserts additional states in the loop body.
Array Mappings Maps the arrays to registers or on-chip memories
Clock Period Sets the target clock period for the synthesis
Table 4.1: Standard knobs provided by HLS tools
High level synthesis enables the transformation of a behavioral description of an
algorithm with no timing information into a hardware implementation in RTL that
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is cycle accurate. HLS uses three processes to enable this - Scheduling, resource
allocation and resource binding. Scheduling is used to assign each operation to a time
step which correspond to a particular clock cycle. Resource allocation is the process
which determines the number and type of hardware modules to be used to implement
the desired operation. Resource binding is the process that assigns operations to the
hardware modules as determined by the resource allocation process.
Intel HLS Compiler and Xilinx Vivado HLS are HLS tools provided by the two
largest FPGA vendors. The high level languages do not have the concept of system
clock. In this work, we use Vivado HLS to conduct design space exploration.
4.2 Testbench for experiments
We conduct our experiments using Vivado HLS tool provided by Xilinx. Xilinx
Vivado HLS tranforms a high level specification, written in C, C++, SystemC or an
OpenCL API C Kernal into a RTL implementation that can be synthesized into a
Xilinx Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). In applications where the FPGA is
used to verify an ASIC design, HLS would be a good tool and the same prototyping
flow can be used. However, since HLS will use built-in resources such as DSP48 to
infer the RTL, these cannot be used for the ultimate ASIC design, as the FPGA
specific design components will not translate.
Vivado HLS design flow can be summarized as follows:
1. Compile, Execute and Debug C specification.
The first step is to compile and execute the C specification to make sure the
results match with the golden reference file. A C testbench file is responsible
for calling the C specification implemented as a C function, retrieve the results
and compare against the golden reference file. The designer can make use of
the debugging functionality provided by Xilinx Vivado to resolve any issues at
this stage.
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Figure 4.1: Vivado HLS Design Flow
2. Synthesize C specification into an RTL implementation.
Optimization directives and constraints can be applied to the design to synthe-
size the C specification into RTL implementation for the desired FPGA.
3. Generate reports regarding hardware resource utilization and timing.
These reports can be utilized to explore the design space and modify the opti-
mization directives and constraints until the desired design criteria is achieved.
4. C/RTL Cosimulation.
The C testbench added for the C simulation can be used to verify the function-
ality of the RTL.
5. Package RTL implementation into an IP.
The RTL can be exported into an IP in any of the following Xilinx IP formats:
Vivado IP Catalog, System Generator for DSP, Synthesized Checkpoint.
4.2.1 Opimization directives
Optimization directives are features provided by Vivado to produce a micro-
architecture that satisfy the desired performance and design goals.
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The optimization directives provided by Vivado are allocation, array map, ar-
ray partition, array reshape, clock, data pack, dataflow, dependence, expression balance,
function instantiate, inline, interface, latency, loop flatten, loop merge, loop tripcount,
occurence, pipeline, protocol, reset, resource, stream, top, unroll.
The optimization directives used in this work are discussed in detail below:
Loop Pipelining: Loops in the high level specification can be pipelined when
implemented in the hardware to accept new inputs every N clock cycles, where N is
the loop initiation interval. Pipelining of designs necessitates use of registers between
pipeline stages generating high latency, high throughput designs. High throughput is
possible if the loop iterations can be overlapped, which might be restricted if there
are dependencies across iterations.
Loop Unrolling : Loops in the high level specification can be unrolled to exploit
spatial parallelism, to reduce the number of iterations to N/F, where N is the total
number of iteration and F is the unroll factor. To enable this, there must be F copies
of the loop operation.
Reset : This directive is used to add or remove reset on a specific variable. When
the reset signal is applied to the accelerator or IP block, this directive helps control
the registers which should be reset. Fine grain control over reset becomes useful when
static or global arrays or variables are present in the design.
Interface : This directive helps specify how the RTL ports need to be created
from the function description.
Resource : This directive is used to specify a specific library resource (core) to
implement a variable (array, arithmetic operation or function argument) in the RTL.
Array Partitioning : This directive can be used to restructure arrays synthesized
in the design into individual elements.
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4.2.2 Design analysis key concepts
Area : Vivado HLS generates a utilization estimate report that provides the
number of BRAMs, DSPs, FFs and LUTs required to implement the design. We
compare area of different designs by comparing the number of LUTs that would be
required to implement the design.
Latency : Vivado HLS generates timing reports that provides the number of clock
cycles required by a particular design to complete an operation for a particular clock
period. We synthesize the designs for clock periods - 5ns, 10ns, 15ns, 50ns. These
were the typical frequencies used in other works on accelerators for sensor nodes
designed in reconfigurable hardware. Data transfer rate : It is determined as the
ratio of the total number of words transferred to and from the accelerator to the total
number of clock cycles taken to complete accelerator operation.
4.3 Experimental Setup
Xilinx Vivado HLS was used to simulate and synthesize the designs by following
the Vivado HLS design flow as explained in section 4.2. The high level specification
of the architectures presented in the previous chapter were given as design specifi-
cation to Vivado HLS. Various optimization directives were applied to the design to
perform analysis. The high level designs were synthesized for Zynq device in Zed-
board - xc7z020clg484-1. The total number of LUTs, FFs, DSP48Es and BRAM 18Ks
available in the device are 53200, 106400, 220 and 280 respectively. The aim of the
experiments are:
• To implement the proposed accelerator architecture and verify its functionality.
• To implement accelerators suitable for FIOS and CIOS algorithms and compare
them with the proposed architecture
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Figure 4.2: Zedboard-Zynq block diagram [4]
• To analyze the design space by making use of optimization directives provided
by HLS.
4.3.1 Number of Ports
The architecture hardware blocks or accelerators are assumed to have only specific
number of ports to transfer data in and out of the system as discussed in the previous
chapter. They are tabulated below in table 4.2.
FIOS CIOS Proposed ACC
Ports 2
Single unidirectional port for a,
Single bidirectional port for t
Single unidirectional port for a,
Single bidirectional port for t
Ports 3
Single unidirectional port for a,
Single unidirectional port for n,
Single bidirectional port for t
Single unidirectional port for a,
Dual bidirectional port for t
Single unidirectional port for a,
Dual bidirectional port for t
Ports 4
Single unidirectional port for a,
Single unidirectional port for n,
Dual bidirectional port for t
Dual unidirectional port for a
Dual bidirectional port for t
Dual unidirectional port for a,
Dual bidirectional port for t
Unconstrained No restriction for data transfer No restriction for data transfer No restriction for data transfer
Table 4.2: Port definition and usage for FIOS, CIOS and proposed accelerator archi-
tecture
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Figure 4.3: Resource directive applied to operands
To facilitate this, we assume that the inputs to the accelerator are stored in
RAMs (Random Access Memory) external to the accelerator. Vivado HLS provides
an optimization directive under Resource where the inputs can be chosen to be stored
in RAM 1P BRAM (Single Port) or RAM 2P BRAM (Dual Port). Block RAMs (or
BRAM) stands for Block Random Access Memory. Block RAMs are used for storing
data in Xilinx FPGA. We also intend to compare the design if there is no restriction to
input availability. To facilitate unconstrained availability of inputs to the accelerator,
the optimization directive ’Array Partition complete’ is applied to the operands.
Note that the FIOS design cannot be synthesized with 2 ports as it requires
minimum of 3 ports to transfer inputs.
4.3.2 Word size
The word size, denoted by w of the word wise multiplication algorithms were
varied to be of 8bits, 16 bits and 32 bits to study the variation in their performance.
The architecture demands word size and double word size registers, The registers
were defined to be of different data types according to the word size requirement as
shown in the table 4.3. High level specification had to be modified to implement this
variation, see listing 4.1.
1 #ifndef CIOS_H_
2 #define CIOS_H_
3
4 #define MPM_LEN_IN_BITS 1024
5 #define WORD_LEN_IN_BITS 16 //int = 32 bits
6 #define N MPM_LEN_IN_BITS/WORD_LEN_IN_BITS
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8 bit 16 bit 32 bit
word char short int
double word short int long long
Table 4.3: Data types in HLS for register word sizes
7 #define DISP_WORDS_PER_ROW 8
8
9
10 /*
11 // Uncomment if word size = 8 bits
12 typedef unsigned char word;
13 typedef unsigned short double_word;
14 */
15
16
17 // Uncomment if word size = 16 bits
18 typedef unsigned short word;
19 typedef unsigned int double_word;
20
21
22 /*
23 // Uncomment if word size = 32 bits
24 typedef unsigned int word;
25 typedef unsigned long long double_word;
26 */
27 void cios(word x[N],word y,word out_r[N+1]);
28
29 #endif
Listing 4.1: C code snippet that shows word size variants
4.3.3 Other design points
Vivado HLS allows the designs to be synthesized with different clock periods.
The clock periods were varied to be 5ns, 10ns, 15ns and 50ns to observe the variation
in the synthesized design. Vivado HLS also provides an optimization directive called
PIPELINE that could be applied to loops. If the loops are capable of being pipelined,
this would give to designs with better throughput.
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4.4 Experimental results
Once the designs and simulated and synthesized, Vivado HLS provides utilization
and timing reports for design analysis. The first analysis performed, is to compare
both pipelined and unpipelined versions of all architectures for different port avail-
ability. The comparison is done in terms of the number of clock cycles taken to
achieve Montgomery Multiplication and the area requirement in terms of LUTs for
each design.
The architectures for CIOS accelerator, FIOS accelerator and proposed accelerator
and their pipelined variations are simulated and synthesized with a clock period of
5ns, 10ns, 15ns and 50ns. The results for clock period of 5ns are plotted here. The
designs are also synthesized for varying port availability. In the first set of graphs
indicated by Ports vs Clock Cycles, the number of clock cycles taken to compute
Montgomery multiplication is plotted against the number of ports available to the
accelerator. This is plotted for various word sizes in figures 4.4, 4.8, 4.12. The same
set of graphs are plotted with latency in microseconds instead of clock cycles in 4.6,
4.10, 4.14. For all the base designs, the latency does not seem to vary much with
increase in the number of ports. For the pipelined versions however, as the accelerator
contains more ports, the performance of the systems seems to improve.
In the second set of graphs indicated by Ports vs LUTs, the number of LUTs
to be utilized for the design is plotted against the number of ports available to the
accelerator. This is plotted for various word sizes in figures 4.5, 4.9, 4.13.
Since the area of the pipelined version of proposed accelerator is higher than the
rest of the architectures, we unroll the CIOS, FIOS, both base and pipelined versions
by unroll factor of 2, 4 and 8 to see if increasing the area leads to better performance.
We observe that even after increasing the area, the latency does not as compared to
proposed accelerator architecture. This is plotted in figures 4.7, 4.11, 4.15.
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Figure 4.4: Number of ports vs number of clock cycles to calculate MM(us) for
accelerator with 8 bit word size
Figure 4.5: Number of ports vs LUTs utilized in accelerator with 8 bit word size
4.4.1 Latency calculation
For all algorithms, a sequential architecture required to implement the algorithm
is synthesized. The architecture as such is capable of implementing only 2 blocks
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Figure 4.6: Number of ports vs latency to calculate MM(us) for accelerator with 8
bit word size
Figure 4.7: LUTs utilized vs Latency to calculate MM(us) for designs with 8 bit word
size
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Figure 4.8: Number of ports vs number of clock cycles to calculate MM(us) for
accelerator with 16 bit word size
Figure 4.9: Number of ports vs LUTs utilized in accelerator with 16 bit word size
in all cases as discussed previously. They have to be iterated a specific number of
times to implement the Montgomery multiplication. Hence the latency is calculated
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Figure 4.10: Number of ports vs latency to calculate MM(us) for accelerator with 16
bit word size
Figure 4.11: LUTs utilized vs Latency to calculate MM(us) for designs with 16 bit
word size
64
Figure 4.12: Number of ports vs number of clock cycles to calculate MM(us) for
accelerator with 32 bit word size
Figure 4.13: Number of ports vs LUTs utilized in accelerator with 32 bit word size
by finding out the time taken by each architecture to implement a row in the data
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Figure 4.14: Number of ports vs latency to calculate MM(us) for accelerator with 32
bit word size
Figure 4.15: LUTs utilized vs Latency to calculate MM(us) for designs with 32 bit
word size
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flow block diagram and then extrapolating it to implement complete Montgomery
Multiplication for valid comparison.
If the multiprecision number is split into s words of w bits each, then the time
taken to compute Montgomery Multiplication can be computed according to the
following equations. Since calculation of m is not part of hotspot function, it is not
implemented in the accelerator architecture. Hence, the time taken to compute m is
not accounted for.
Using CIOS accelerator, if Latencyrow is the time taken to complete a row of
operations in the data flow block diagram, then the latency to complete Montgomery
multiplication would be,
LatencyMM = Latencyrow ∗ s ∗ 2
This is because there are s rows to compute integer multiplication and s rows to
compute Montgomery reduction.
Using FIOS accelerator, if Latencyrow is the time taken to complete a row in the
data flow block diagram, then the latency to complete Montgomery multiplication
would be,
LatencyMM = Latencyrow ∗ s
This is because a block of integer multiplication and Montgomery reduction is
computed in an interleaved manner. Since the blocks are computed concurrently,
there are only s rows in total to compute both integer multiplication and Montgomery
reduction.
Using the proposed design for accelerator, if Latencyrow is the time taken to com-
plete a row in the data flow block diagram, then the latency to complete Montgomery
multiplication would be,
LatencyMM = Latencyrow ∗ s
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This is because 2 blocks of integer multiplication or montgomery reductions are
computed in parallel. Hence, there are only s rows in total to compute integer mul-
tiplication and Montgomery reduction.
4.5 Observation and analysis
Let iteration 1 be defined as the time taken to generate the first set of partial
products by running the accelerator once. The accelerator design proposed generates
partial products for indices 0, 1 and 2 in the first iteration. In the second iteration it
computes partial products for indices 1, 2 and 3. In the first iteration, the architecture
is expected to produce final product for index 0. The rest of the partial products
are registered for the use in the following iterations. In the second iteration, the
final product for index 1 is expected. The inputs required to generate the final
product is generated in the current iteration and the previous iteration which have
been registered. In order to produce output final product for a specific iteration, the
datapath involves a single block (a single multiplier and associated adder circuitry).
For the accelerator that implements CIOS architecture, the first iteration deals
with indices 0, 1 and 2. The second iteration deals with computation of outputs for
indices 2, 3 and 4. This necessitates that after the first iteration, the final products
for indices 0 and 1 should be computed. After the second iteration, the final products
for indices 2 and 3 should be computed. In order to do so, the datapath of the final
product for the higher index involves 2 blocks (2 multipliers and associated adder
circuitry).
For the accelerator that implements FIOS architecture, the first iteration deals
with computation of partial products for indices 0 and 1. The second iteration deals
with computation of outputs for indices 1 and 2. This necessitates that after the first
iteration, the final product of index 1 should be computed. In order to do so the
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datapath of the final product for a specific iteration involves 2 blocks (2 multipliers
and associated adder circuitry).
We observe that the pipelined versions of the accelerators performs better than
the corresponding base designs for all architectures. This could be because there is
scope for some units of the design to be operated in parallel. The adder operation
of one iteration and the multiplier operation of the subsequent iteration do not have
data dependency and hence can be operated in parallel.
Since there is no data dependency between the 2 multiplier blocks or the 2 adder
blocks to produce output for that iteration in the proposed accelerator architecture,
the various units in the architecture is much more suited for pipelining. However,
for CIOS and FIOS architectures, since the datapath involves either the multiplier or
the adder unit to be stalled by the other unit, there is a data dependency between
various units, and hence the accelerator architecture cannot be completely pipelined.
Hence the performance of the pipelined version of the proposed accelerator is better
than the other designs, but since it involves inputs to be registered and additional
adder circuitry, the design consumes more area as can be seen from the number of
LUTs consumed on the device.
4.5.1 Effect of increasing number of ports on each design
We study the effect of increasing the number of ports in the accelerator architec-
tures on the performance for all word lengths. We observe that as the number of
ports increases, there is an improvement in the performance for all pipelined versions
of the accelerators. However, their performance tend to be comparable when the in-
put availability is unconstrained. This proves that the architecture of the accelerator
design impacts the performance of the accelerators depending on input availability.
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4.5.2 Effect of increasing area in other architectures
We observe that the latency of the pipelined version of the proposed accelerator is
lower but at the cost of higher area. In order to see if the performance of the reference
architectures improve with increase in area, we unroll the design by factors of 2, 4 and
8 and compare the LUTs consumed and latency. In the set of graphs indicated by
LUTs vs Latency, this information is plotted. We observe that even with increase in
area, the other designs cannot achieve the performance seen in the proposed design.
4.5.3 Effect of word size in the performance of proposed accelerator de-
sign
The speedup of the proposed accelerator design against the design CIOS pipelined
for when accelerator has 2 ports and FIOS pipelined when accelerator has 3 and 4
ports are plotted in table
Ports 2 Ports 3 Ports 4
8 bit 47.55 64.63 48.65
16 bit 46.6 61.7 43.8
32 bit 44.5 54.2 35.1
Table 4.4: Speedup of proposed design
Ports 2 Ports 3 Ports 4
8 bit 2.54 1.82 1.38
16 bit 2.34 1.68 1.33
32 bit 1.71 1.56 1.49
Table 4.5: Area requirement of proposed design as compared to base design
We observe that as word size increases, the speedup observed decreases. This
is because as w goes higher, the number of words (s) to which the multi-precision
number gets split into decreases. As the number of words decreases, the number of
iterations of the accelerator to calculate Montgomery product also decreases, thus
reducing the effectiveness of the accelerator in speeding up the overall algorithm.
70
4.6 Implementation in ZedBoard
We prototype the 32 bit word size version of our proposed accelerator with inter-
faces to single port BRAMs in the Zedboard.
Designs generated in Vivado HLS could be exported as a Vivado HLS IP (Intel-
lectual Property) to provide easy integration of IP with other development tools in
Vivado and ISE design suite.
The IP can be exported in IP-XACT format, or as a pcore for XPS-based (Xilinx
Platform Studio based) system or for use in system generators for DSPs. IP-XACT
is an xml format that defines and describes IP to facilitate their use in Integrated
Circuits. Exporting in IP-XACT format allows module to be easily integrated to
Vivado IP Integrator design and hence we adopt this method.
Before exporting the design as an IP, we assign block-level protocol for the design
to be saxilite (AXI4-Lite). AXI is a protocol belonging to ARM AMBA family of
microcontroller buses. AMBA is an on-chip interconnect specification, allowing con-
nection and management of peripherals and controllers in a multi-master design. The
AXI protocol is optimized for Xilinx FPGA implementations and is used as the means
of communication between IP cores of an FPGA design. There are 3 variations of the
AXI4 interface - AXI4, AXI4-Lite and AXI4-Stream. We use AXI4-Lite interface for
the IP block interface. We specify the operand interfaces to be ’bram’ and specify all
of them to be of single port.
Using Vivado 2018.3 IDE, we integrate the exported IP ”cios acc 0” into Zynq
SoC device of Zedboard. In the SoC, we configure the Zynq processing system (PS)
and instantiate other IPs like ”cios acc 0” and BRAM IPs for each of the operand
in the (Programmable Logic) PL part. It is not enough to just integrate the the
exported IP ”cios acc 0” to BRAMs. The Zynq processor should also be able to
communicate to the BRAMs to read and write values to it. For this purpose we make
all the BRAMs to be dual port and include AXI BRAM controllers for Zynq PS to
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Figure 4.16: SoC design with accelerator synthesized in Zedboard
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Figure 4.17: Interfacing with Zedboard via JTAG terminal
interact with the BRAMs. One port is used to interface with our IP and the other
port is used to interface with Zynq PS. Vivado IP integrator provides Connection
Automation and Block Automation to aid in connections involvig AXI interfaces, clk
and reset signals. The design synthesized in the Zedboard is shown in figure 4.16.
The design is then validated, a HDL wrapper is created and the bitstream to
program FPGA is generated. The Xilinx SDK 2018.3 helps in programming the
FPGA with the bitstream and developing the software for Zynq Processor System.
The code snippet is shown in Listing B.1. The cios acc 0 IP is first initialized and
sanity checks are performed. The x, y and out BRAMs are initialized with input data.
The cios acc 0 is then invoked to compute the results. The Zedboard is connected to
the PC COM6 Serial Port with baud rate of 115200. After booting the system from
SD Card, the PC is interfaced to the Zedboard via JTAG port. The results of the
accelerator are verified through JTAG terminal as shown in figure 4.17.
Thus, the proposed accelerator is compared with accelerator architectures imple-
menting CIOS and FIOS algorithms in terms of performance and area. The function-
ality of the proposed accelerator architecture is verified and is prototyped by designing
a Zynq SoC in Xilinx Zedboard.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
The RSA algorithm, one of the most prevalent PKC schemes, was profiled to de-
termine the bottleneck function which could be accelerated to achieve performance
improvement in resource constrained edge devices. The bottleneck function was de-
termined to be the mpi mul hlp function, which is a loop function of the Montgomery
multiplication algorithm, commonly used for modular multiplications in the RSA key
generation algorithm. A novel architecture for accelerating the loop function of the
Montgomery multiplication was proposed, which was designed with system level con-
straints in mind. The design was simulated, synthesized and compared against other
accelerator architectures that implement variants of Montgomery algorithm in the lit-
erature. We observe that the pipelined version of the proposed accelerator performs
better than other architectures when the number of ports in the accelerators are 2,
3 and 4. The average speedups observed are 46.21%, 60.27%, 38.1% as compared
to the base designs when the number of ports available in the system are 2, 3 and
4 respectively with area requirement 2.19, 1.68 and 1.4 times higher than the base
designs to which are used for comparison.
5.2 Future Work
In this work, only the operand scanning methods to compute Montgomery multi-
plication have only been analyzed due to their uniform structure. Minimal architec-
tures in terms of area and capable of computing Montgomery product in a sequential
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manner for product and hybrid scanning methods could be synthesized and a com-
parison could be established in terms of area and performance. Another possible
extension would be to measure the power and energy consumed by the various ac-
celerator architectures that implements Montgomery multiplication in a sequential
manner and establishing a study based on power profile. As both power and perfor-
mance increase linearly, the energy is expected to remain the same (for the multiplier).
In all of these architectures, we assumed that the input operands were stored in an
external memory and fed to the accelerator as and when required. In most cases, the
same word has to be fed a number of times to complete montgomery multiplication.
By assuming that the accelerator has internal memory to store operands, one could
analyze to see, storing which operands would benefit the accelerator reduce network
traffic. Storing all the operands would be the best, but it has an area overhead.
Typically it is observed that accelerator on-chip memory consumes about 40-90% of
accelerator area [22]. In an attempt to reduce the area, one can analyze the algo-
rithm to determine which operands when stored can give maximum benefit for the
invested area. Since accelerator implements a sequential design and works on mul-
tiprecision operands, the algorithm that accelerator implements greatly determines
which operands when stored can give maximum benefit. The size of the internal
memory could be increased incrementally to figure out an optimal memory size that
would benefit each accelerator architecture.
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APPENDIX A
HIGH LEVEL SPECIFICATION OF ACCELERATOR
ARCHITECTURES
The high level specification of accelerator architectures in C, which are given as
inputs to Vivado HLS tool are given below.
A.1 CIOS accelerator
1 #include "cios.h"
2
3 void cios(word x[N], word y, word out_r[N+1])
4 { // Accumulates x[i]*y to out_r [0..N-1]
5 // out_r[N] is generated (Not accumulated) as out_r[N] can be
generated only in this iteration
6 int i;
7 static double_word SC = 0;
8 static double_word XY = 0;
9 static double_word sum1;
10 static word x_read;
11 static word out_read;
12 static word SC_lower;
13 static word C = 0;
14
15 cios_loop: for(i=0; i<N; i++){
16
17 x_read = x[i];
18 out_read = out_r[i];
19
20 XY = x_read * y;
21 sum1 = out_read + XY ;
22 SC = sum1 + C;
23
24 C = (word)((SC & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
25 SC_lower = (word)(SC & 0x0000ffff);
26 out_r[i] = SC_lower;
27
28 }
29 out_r[N] = (word)((SC & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
30 }
Listing A.1: High level specification of CIOS accelerator
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A.2 FIOS accelerator
1 #include "fios.h"
2
3 void fios(word x[N], word y, word m, word n[N], word out_r[N+1])
4 {
5 int i;
6 static double_word XY;
7 static double_word MN;
8
9 static double_word SC_xy;
10 static word S_xy;
11 static word C_xy;
12
13 static double_word SC_mn;
14 static word C_mn;
15
16 static double_word SC;
17
18 fios_loop: for(i=0; i<N; i++)
19 {
20 XY = x[i] * y;
21 MN = m * n[i];
22
23 SC_xy = out_r[i] + XY + C_xy;
24
25 C_xy = (word)(( SC_xy & 0xffff0000) >>16);
26 S_xy = (word)(SC_xy & 0x0000ffff);
27
28 SC_mn = S_xy + MN + C_mn;
29
30 if (i==0)
31 out_r [0] = S_xy;
32 else
33 out_r[i-1] = (word)(SC_mn & 0x0000ffff);
34 C_mn = (word)(( SC_mn & 0xffff0000) >>16);
35 }
36
37 SC = out_r[N] + C_mn + C_xy;
38 out_r[N-1] = (word)(SC & 0x0000ffff);
39 out_r[N] = (word)((SC & 0xffff0000) >>16);
40 }
Listing A.2: High level specification of FIOS accelerator
A.3 Proposed accelerator
1 #include "proposed_acc.h"
2
3 void proposed_acc(word x[N], word y[2], word out_r[N+3])
4 { // Accumulates x[i]*y to out_r [0..N-1]
5 // out_r[N] is generated (Not accumulated) as out_r[N] can be
generated only in this iteration
6 char i;
7 static double_word S0C0_comb;
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8 static double_word S1C1_comb;
9 static double_word S2C2_comb;
10
11 static word S0;
12 static word C0;
13 static word S1;
14 static word S2;
15 static word C1;
16 static word C2;
17
18 static double_word AB0;
19 static double_word AB1;
20
21 static word AB0_low;
22 static word AB0_high;
23 static word AB1_low;
24 static word AB1_high;
25
26 static word y0;
27 static word y1;
28
29 static word out_read_0;
30 static word out_read_1;
31 static word out_read_2;
32
33 static word y_read_0;
34 static word y_read_1;
35
36 static word x_read;
37
38 short N_plus_1;
39 short N_plus_2;
40
41 C0 = 0;
42 C1 = 0;
43 C2 = 0;
44
45 //Load S0 ,S1 ,S2
46 out_read_0 = out_r [0];
47 S0 = out_read_0;
48
49 out_read_1 = out_r [1];
50 S1 = out_read_1;
51
52 y_read_0 = y[0];
53 y_read_1 = y[1];
54
55 y0 = y_read_0;
56 y1 = y_read_1;
57
58 Inner_loop: for(i=0;i<N;i++)
59 {
60 out_read_2 = out_r[i+2];
61 S2 = out_read_2;
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62
63 x_read = x[i];
64
65 AB0 = x_read * y0;
66 AB1 = x_read *y1;
67
68 AB0_high = (word)((AB0 & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
69 AB0_low = (word)(AB0 & 0x0000ffff);
70
71 AB1_high = (word)((AB1 & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
72 AB1_low = (word)(AB1 & 0x0000ffff);
73
74 S2C2_comb = AB1_high + S2 + C2;
75 S1C1_comb = AB0_high + S1 + C1 + AB1_low;
76 S0C0_comb = AB0_low + S0 + C0;
77
78 S0 = (word)(S1C1_comb & 0x0000ffff);
79 S1 = (word)(S2C2_comb & 0x0000ffff);
80
81 C0 = (word)(( S0C0_comb & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
82 C1 = (word)(( S1C1_comb & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
83 C2 = (word)(( S2C2_comb & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
84
85 out_r[i] = (word)(S0C0_comb & 0x0000ffff);
86 }
87
88 N_plus_1 = N + 1;
89 N_plus_2 = N + 2;
90
91 out_r[N] = S0 + C0;
92 out_r[N_plus_1] = S1 + C1;
93 out_r[N_plus_2] = C2;
94
95 }
Listing A.3: High level specification of proposed accelerator
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APPENDIX B
ACCELERATOR IP IN ZYNQ SOC
The application code that the processor in Zync SoC runs, to communicate with
the accelerator and and the rest of the SoC components, like BRAMs that store
operands, is given below.
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include "platform.h"
3 #include "xcios_acc.h"
4 #include "xil_printf.h"
5 #include "xparameters.h"
6
7 int *XVecHW= (int *)0x40000000;
8 int *YVecHW = (int *)0x42000000;
9 int *OUTVecHW = (int *)0x44000000;
10
11 XCios_acc doCios_acc;
12 XCios_acc_Config *doCios_acc_cfg;
13
14 void init_cios_acc ()
15 {
16 int status = 0;
17 doCios_acc_cfg = XCios_acc_LookupConfig(XPAR_CIOS_ACC_0_DEVICE_ID)
;
18 if(doCios_acc_cfg)
19 {
20 status = XCios_acc_CfgInitialize (& doCios_acc ,doCios_acc_cfg);
21 if (status != XST_SUCCESS)
22 print("\n Failed to initialize \n");
23
24 }
25 }
26 int main()
27 {
28 init_cios_acc ();
29 printf("Test ACC\n\r");
30 for (int i=0; i<32; i++ )
31 {
32 XVecHW[i] = 0x1789ffff + i;
33 }
34 for (int i=0; i<2 ; i++)
35 {
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36 YVecHW[i] = 0x23f80001 + i ;
37 }
38 for (int i=0; i< 35; i++)
39 {
40 OUTVecHW[i] = 0;
41 }
42 XCios_acc_Start (& doCios_acc);
43 while(! XCios_acc_IsDone (& doCios_acc));
44 for (int i=0; i<35;i++)
45 {
46 xil_printf("%x \t",OUTVecHW[i]);
47 if (i%8==0)
48 xil_printf("\n");
49 }
50 print("Done Test ACC\n\r");
51 return 0;
52 }
Listing B.1: Application program to run accelerator on Zynq SoC
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